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Using a panel of 23 industrialised countries, the paper investigates how short-
run and long-run income risks are shared and how the source of uncertainty
matters for the way this risk gets insured. Surprisingly, short-term and long-
term output risks are found to be equally well insured. Transitory shocks get
smoothed almost completely whereas permanent shocks remain 80 percent
uninsured. We …nd a somewhat more important role for international capital
markets than earlier studies. Whereas our results tie in with some recent
theoretical insights and are consistent with empirical …ndings on home bias
in international portfolios, they raise the question why permanent shocks are
so hard to insure internationally.
Keywords: International Consumption Risk Sharing, Euro-
pean Integration, Panel Data, Panel Vector Autoregressions
JEL Classi…cation: F41, F431 Introduction
Do industrialised countries use the same channels to insure against long-
term and short-term income risks? Do they insure in di¤erent ways against
di¤erent types of shocks? This paper aims to provide an answer to these
questions.
The starting point of our analysis is the observation that most countries’
consumption risks do not seem to be internationally diversi…ed. French and
Poterba (1991) were the …rst to hint at the huge home biases in interna-
tional equity portfolios. This non-diversi…cation puzzle has been cast into
various formulations that are not only based on stocks of foreign assets but
also on ‡ow variables. Most notably, Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992)
demonstrated that international consumption correlations are too low to be
explained by models with perfect capital mobility and complete asset mar-
kets.
A complementary perspective on international non-diversi…cation is pro-
vided in a series of papers by Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996) and
Sørensen and Yosha (1998). Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996), hence-
forth ASY, suggested a simple decomposition of income risk that allows to
distinguish between the cross-sectional and the intertemporal dimension of
risk sharing. The cross-sectional dimension is re‡ected in the cross-border
ownership of state contingent assets such as equity or in …scal transfer schemes.
The intertemporal dimension is re‡ected in borrowing and lending, i.e. in
the use of national or international credit markets.
In US state-level data ASY (1996) …nd that 39 percent of shocks to gross
state product are smoothed by capital markets, 13 percent are smoothed
by the federal government, and 23 percent are smoothed by credit markets.
Conversely, Sørensen and Yosha (1998) …nd that EU and OECD countries
achieve much less cross-sectional risk sharing than do US states. Mélitz
and Zumer (1999) extended the ASY study by including further exogenous
variables like regional size and the real interest rate. Their results by and
large corroborate the ASY …ndings.
The …ndings of the line of research surveyed here - and to which this paper
aims to contribute - may have far-reaching implications for the prospective
workings of the European Monetary Union. A plethora of studies documents
that, in terms of Mundell’s (1961) classical criteria, Europe is much less of
an optimum currency area than are e.g. the United States. In particular,
macroeconomic shocks are generally found to be much less symmetric in
Euroland than among US states. Against this background, answering to
which degree capital markets contribute to the insurance of aggregate income
and consumption risk has become a question of paramount importance: if
1shocks are asymmetric, maybe they can be smoothed through su¢cient risk
sharing. A monetary union that experiences asymmetric macroeconomic
disturbances may not appear optimal when measured against the classical
OCA criteria but it may provide a huge pool of risks that can be optimally
insured - as long as the channels mentioned above are actually available and
do get exploited.
Sørensen and Yosha (1998) conclude quite negatively in this respect:
given that European countries do not seem to exploit risk sharing oppor-
tunities, EMU could entail high welfare costs in the absence of intensi…ed
…scal transfer mechanisms. Mélitz and Zumer on the other hand conclude
that the start of monetary union will promote the sharing of risks via market
channels.
In this paper, we extend the method by ASY (1996) to a fully dynamic
framework1. In so doing, we use recently developed methods for the estima-
tion of panel vector autoregressions. Our method allows us to assess how in-
come uncertainty at short and long forecast horizons is insured. It also allows
us to investigate how di¤erent types of income uncertainty get insured. The
most important distinction to be made along these lines is the one between
permanent and transitory shocks to income. Insurance against permanent
idiosyncratic shocks requires perpetual claims on some sort of income that
is negatively correlated with a country’s own income stream. Conversely,
transitory ‡uctuations can be completely smoothed through borrowing and
lending. Ap r i o r i , we should therefore expect that permanent shocks get
insured through di¤erent channels than transitory shocks and our economet-
ric model allows us to disentangle these two types of shocks with minimal
identifying restrictions.
Our results can be summarized as follows:
² Short-term and long-term risks are insured in the same ways. The fore-
cast horizon does not matter for either the choice of insurance channel
nor for the extent to which income risk is insured overall.
² Insurance against transitory shocks to income is generally much better
than against permanent shocks and is achieved largely through credit
markets, i.e. the intertemporal risk sharing channel. This result ties in
with the theoretical …ndings by Baxter and Crucini (1995) who demon-
strated that, as long as shocks are not too persistent, the full risk shar-
ing allocations that pertain in models with complete asset markets can
1Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (2000) provide an analysis of risk sharing at various
time horizons but their model does not allow the ident…cation of risk sharing channels.
2be very well approximated in models that only feature non-state con-
tingent borrowing and lending. Whereas Baxter’s and Crucini’s work
provides a theoretical rationalization of our results, a recent empirical
study by Kraay, Loayza, Serven and Ventura (2000) has demonstrated
that countries’ international portfolios are largely held in the form of
international credit rather than equity. This is the empirical corollary
that may explain the importance of the credit channel for the sharing
of transitory income risks.
² Earlier results in the literature suggested that capital markets pro-
vide only a minimal share of the total consumption insurance that is
achieved between countries. Even though the role of capital markets for
consumption insurance remains limited once we condition on the type
of shock, their role seems much more respectable than would appear
from our unconditional dynamic setup or from the results obtained in
Sørensen and Yosha (1998).
² There is some evidence of insurance of permanent shocks through the
intertemporal channel. The reason for this could be that a big share
of a country’s GDP cannot be traded on capital markets, e.g. because
labour income is non-insurable. This may give rise to pre-cautionary
savings. Athanasoulis and Shiller (2000) have shown how the degree of
market incompleteness a¤ects the incidence of precautionary savings.
Our results lend further empirical support to their view.
² Overall, roughly 60 percent of income variability in industrialised coun-
tries remains uninsured, most of it due to a failure to insure against
permanent ‡uctuations in income.
Our results may also have important implications for further research into
the sources of the home bias. It is generally found that national capital mar-
kets do much better in providing insurance to regions than do international
capital markets in providing insurance to countries (compare for example
the results in Asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha (1996) and Sorensen and Yosha
(1998)). Also, international asymmetries in output ‡uctuations are generally
much more persistent than intranational ones (see for example Chamie et
al. (1994)). At the same time, our results reveal that the failure of interna-
tional capital markets to provide insurance is particularly due to a lack of
insurance of ’permanent’ income risks. An important question that future
research should address is therefore why international capital markets do so
badly in providing insurance against permanent shocks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:
3Section two outlines our dynamic econometric model of international risk
sharing. In our empirical implementation, we rely on a panel vector au-
toregression that we implement using the method suggested by Holtz-Eakin,
Newey and Rosen (1988). Our approach has the advantage that we only
have to rely on cross-sectional asymptotics. Furthermore, we can identify
permanent and transitory shocks to output with only minimal identifying
assumptions by exploiting equilibrium relations between the data. Section
three describes the data and our empirical results. We report the results of
our analysis in section four and we o¤er conclusions in section …ve.
2A d y n a m i c m o d e l o f r i s k s h a r i n g
In this section we propose a dynamic econometric model that enables us to
analyse the how income risk is shared over time. More speci…cally, our model
allows us to identify the relative roles of intertemporal (i.e. borrowing and
lending) and cross-sectional smoothing (i.e. insurance through international
capital markets)2.
The starting point of our analysis is the following decomposition of the
variance of per capita GDP-growth:
var(¢gdptjIt¡1)=cov(¢gdp¡ ¢gnp;¢gdptjIt¡1) (1)
+cov(¢gnp¡ ¢c;¢gdptjIt¡1)
+cov(¢c;¢gdptjIt¡1)
Lower case letters denote logarithms and gnp and c denote gross national
product and consumption per capita respectively. The conditioning informa-
tion set It¡1 contains realizations of variables that are known at the end of
period t ¡ 1.
We can divide (1) by var(¢gdptjIt¡1) to get:
1=¯C + ¯S + ¯U
where
¯ =
2
4
¯C
¯S
¯U
3
5 =
1
var(¢gdpjIt¡1)
2
4
cov(¢gdp¡ ¢gnp;¢gdp)
cov(¢gnp¡ ¢c;¢gdp)
cov(¢c;¢gdp)
jIt¡1
3
5 (2)
2Our method is closely related to Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996). Their ap-
proach is completely static, however. Another di¤erence between our model and and ASY
is that we do not allow for a …scal insurance channel. Sørensen and Yosha (1998) have
demonstrated that the …scal channel is not important for the international dimension of
risk sharing which is what we focus on in this paper.
4The individual coe¢cients in ¯ can now be associated with various chan-
nels of risk sharing. The GDP-GNP di¤erential re‡ects international factor
income ‡ows. Hence, ¯c measures to what extent capital income from abroad
covaries with GDP. Therefore, ¯c can be thought of as representing the cross-
sectional dimension of consumption insurance that is achieved (primarily)
through cross-border ownership of foreign assets, i.e. through international
capital markets.3
The GNP-C di¤erential measures savings and ¯s gives the contribution of
the intertemporal aspect of consumption insurance (i.e. smoothing through
savings). Finally, ¯U is the residual covariance between consumption growth
and GDP growth, re‡ecting the undiversi…ed or unsmoothed component of
consumption.
We will now describe, how we identify the conditional variances and co-
variances involved in (1). For this purpose, let
¢Xt =
2
4
¢gdpt
¢gdpt ¡ ¢gnpt
¢gnpt ¡ ¢ct
3
5
Then we assume that
It = fX¿g
t
¿=1 (3)
and that expectations coincide with linear projections. These assump-
tions allow us to express E(¢XtjIt¡1) as a vector autoregression. The un-
expected component of ¢Xt which we will denote by "t is now given by the
reduced-form residual of the VAR:
©(L)¢Xt= "t (4)
where ©(L) is a 3 £ 3 matrix polynomial in the lag operator, L,w h i c h
satis…es that the roots of det(©(z)) are all outside the unit circle.
Now let ­ denote the variance-covariance matrix of "t and let !ij be the
entry in the i-th row and j- t hc o l u m no f­.T h e n
¯c =
!21
!11
and ¯S =
!31
!11
3As Sørensen and Yosha (1998) note, labour income ‡ows between industrialised coun-
tries are negligible. The same holds true for interest payments on international bonds and
loans. We can therefore think of the GDP-GNP di¤erential as a good proxy of contingent
capital income such as equity returns.
5Of course, the analogue of ¯u is given by
¯u =1¡ ¯c ¡ ¯s (5)
We can now generalize our approach to arbitrary forecast horizons in
order to answer the question as to what the role of various channels for risk
sharing at these horizons may be. The mean squared prediction error in a
VAR, k p e r i o d sa h e a d ,i sg i v e nb y
ª(k)=MSPEk =
k¡1 X
l=0
Cl­C
0
l (6)
where the Cl are the matrix coe¢cients of the moving average representation
of ¢Xt.
Let the entries of ª(k) be denoted by Ãij(k). Then the analogue of ¯
from above can be de…ned:
¯c(k)=
Ã21(k)
Ã11(k)
and ¯s(k)=
Ã31(k)
Ã11(k)
and again
¯u(k)=1¡ ¯c(k) ¡ ¯s(k)
and
¯(k)=
£
¯c(k) ¯s(k) ¯u(k)
¤0
Obviously, ¯(1) = ¯ because C0= I and therefore ª(1) = ­.
Note also that as the forecast horizon gets in…nite, ¯(k) should converge
to the unconditional ¯ that emerges from the static ASY model. Hence, the
basic ASY regression provides a check of speci…cation for any VAR estimation
that may provide the basis for the dynamic decomposition given in (6). We
are now going to deal with estimation issues.
2.1 PVAR Estimation
A naive application to an individual country of the procedure outlined in
the previous section, is not likely to yield meaningful results. Estimating
separate VARs for each country does not allow to control for country …xed
e¤ects, possibly leading to seriously biased estimates. Also, we need to take
into account time varying …xed e¤ects that are common to a whole cross-
section of countries. This is because common or global shocks cannot be
6insured and we have to make sure that they do not pollute our estimates.
We will therefore employ panel techniques in order to identify country-speci…c
and time speci…c components by exploiting not only the time series but also
the cross-sectional dimension. As our sample period is relatively short -
we employ annual data from 1975 to 1990 - we will rely on dynamic panel
methods that are robust to short samples, i.e. require only cross-sectional
asymptotics.
To see the problems that are associated with estimating this type of
dynamic panel models, write out the standard reduced-form representation
(4) to get
¢Xt= ¹ +
p X
l=1
©l¢Xt¡l+"t t = p +1 ;:::;T (7)
Reinterpreting this as a system of panel equations yields
¢Xit= ¹ +
p X
l=1
©l¢Xi;t¡l+¸t + fi + uit i =1 ;:::;K;t = p +1 ;:::;T
(8)
where now all variables vary by i and t,a n dw h e r efi is the vector of
country-speci…c e¤ects and ¸t is a time-speci…c e¤ect. Since ¢Xit is a func-
tion of fi, ¢Xi;t¡1is also a function of fi. Therefore, ¢Xi;t¡1, a right-hand
regressor in (8), is correlated with the error term. This renders the OLS
estimator biased and inconsistent even if the uit are not serially correlated.
For the standard …xed e¤ects (FE) estimator, the Within transformation
wipes out the country-speci…c e¤ects fi,b u t(¢Xi;t¡1 ¡
___
¢Xi;:¡1) where
___
¢Xi;:¡1 =
PT
t=2 ¢Xi;t¡1=(T ¡ 1) will still be correlated with (ui;t ¡
_
ui;:)
even if the uit are not serially correlated. This is because
_
ui;: contains ui;t¡1
which is correlated with ¢Xi;t¡1 by construction. In the technical appendix,
we describe how we have used instrumental variables techniques following
the method by Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988) to estimate the model
g i v e ni n( 8 ) .
In the remainder of this section, we are going to discuss how we can incor-
porate permanent and transitory shocks in the VAR-model (8). Because in
what follows, panel notation will generally not be required, we will henceforth
drop the index i or the …xed e¤ects in our discussion.
72.2 Permanent shocks and risk sharing
Our interest in this paper is on the comovement of growth rates of consump-
tion and various output aggregates. Still,it is possible that the levels of these
variables may have feedback e¤ects on the growth rates. To the extent that
output and consumption are likely to follow integrated processes, such feed-
backs from the level-variables would imply cointegrating relations between
the variables.
In standard models of economic growth cointegrating relationships will
most likely arise in the form of a stationary ’great ratio’ of consumption over
output (see for example King et al. (1991) and Neusser (1991)). In our setup,
the great ratio is just given by the di¤erence c ¡ gnp4.Af o r m a lt e s tb a s e d
on the dynamic panel OLS procedure suggested by Nelson and Sul (2001)
strongly rejected the null of no cointegration between idiosyncratic GNP and
consumption. We therefore decided to add this variable as an error correction
term to the panel VAR model given in (14). Our model accordingly looks as
follows:
¢Xit =© ¢ Xit¡1 + °±
0Xit¡1 + "it (9)
where ±
0 =
£
00¡1
¤
is the cointegrating vector and ° =
£
°1 °2 °3
¤0
represents the vector of adjustment coe¢cients.
An error-correction model such as (9) allows the identi…cation of perma-
nent and transitory disturbances without further identifying assumptions.
Following Johansen (1995), the permanent shocks can be written as
¼it = °
0
?"it (10)
whereas the transitory disturbances are identi…ed by requiring that they
be orthogonal to the space of permanent shocks. Hence
¿ it = °
0­
¡1"it (11)
Note that whenever ¼t or ¿t are non-scalar, the permanent or transitory
shocks are not identi…ed among themselves. However, for our purposes, this
does not matter. The share of the forecast error variance that is explained
by all permanent or transitory shocks does not depend on how we identify
each of these shocks individually.
4We measure the great ratio as C=GNP,n o t ,a si sc o m m o n ,a sC=GDP. The reason for
this is, that at least in principle, a country’s GDP and consumption can diverge arbitrarily
if foreigners own perpetual claims on a su¢ciently large share of that country’s income.
This is exactly what we should see if risk sharing was perfect.
8To see this assume that S¼ and S¿ are appropriately dimensioned non-
singular matrices such that ¼0 = S¼¼ and ¿0 = S¿¿. Let furthermore, as
in the non-cointegrated case, C(L) be the reduced form matrix polynomial
giving the Wold-representation of (9). Then the structural, i.e. just-identi…ed
form is given by C(L)P
¡1 where
P =
·
S¼°0
?
S¿°0­¡1
¸
is just the matrix mapping the reduced-form disturbances into their perma-
nent and transitory components.
It is easily veri…ed that
P
¡1 =
£
­°?(°0
?­°?)¡1S¡1
¼ °(°0­¡1°)
¡1S¡1
¿
¤
Then note that the covariance of
£
¼0 ¿0
¤0 is given by
§=
·
S¼°0
?­°?S0
¼ 0
0S ¿°0­¡1°S¿
¸
Hence, the mean-square prediction error is
ª(k)=
k¡1 X
l=0
Cl
£
­°?(°
0
?­°?)
¡1°
0
?­ + °(°
0­
¡1°)
¡1°
0¤
C
0
l (12)
where the …rst term in parentheses measures the contribution of permanent
shocks and the second the transitory. It can be seen from (12) that ª(k) is
independent of any particular choice of S¼ and S¿. Hence, the relative contri-
butions of permanent and transitory shocks do not depend on the particular
just-identi…cation chosen.
We are now going to report the estimation results for the cointegrated
panel VAR and the ensuing decomposition of the prediction error.
3 Data and Empirical Implementation
We used annual per capita data for GDP, GNP and consumption (C), for 23
industrial countries, from the Penn World Tables (PWT, release 5.6). We
generated world per capita aggregates of each of the three variables using pop-
ulation data from the same source. Annual observations on all three variables
were available for the period 1970-90. In our estimation, we included only
the period 1975-90 in order to avoid potential parameter instability in the
9model that is bound to arise if the oil shock and the aftermath of the demise
of Bretton-Woods was included. Following Sørensen and Yosha (1998), we
did not extend the sample beyond 1990 to avoid instability problems that are
likely to arise from German uni…cation. These limitations make the sample
rather short, but our econometric methods, in particular the instrumentali-
sation following Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988), are designed to cope
with small time dimensions.
We transformed all data into log …rst di¤erences to generate growth rates.
Then, to account for the potential role of global shocks that may create unin-
surable output variability, we formulated the data for each country relative
to the global aggregate. In the setup of the panel, we multiplied the data of
each country with its population weight. The description of variables from
the PWT data base and the list of countries are given in the data appendix.
We then proceeded to the panel estimation of the vector autoregressions
given in (9), using the method by Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen, as de-
scribed in the previous subsection and the technical appendix. In the esti-
mation, we included time-speci…c …xed e¤ects to account for any remaining
cross-sectional dependence and individual-speci…c …xed e¤ects.
We used standard information criteria to determine the lag length of
the VAR-model. Those generally suggested 1-2 lags. As an additional test
of speci…cation, we used the fact that, as k tends to in…nity, ¯(k) should
converge to the unconditional ¯, i.e. the vector of coe¢cients of the simple
panel regressions on ¢gdp of ¢gdp¡¢gnp, ¢gnp¡¢c and ¢c respectively.
This test generally required us to impose two lags which we used throughout.
We then inverted the VAR to generate forecast errors according to (6).
We are now going to discuss the results of this exercise.
4R e s u l t s
In the selection of countries we used for our investigation, we deliberately
only included industrialised economies. This is to ensure that countries are
su¢ciently homogenous to warrant treatment in a single panel estimation.
Our panel, also includes several interesting sub-groupings and we will report
results for these throughout. These sub-groups include the G7, the EU 15
and a core group of European economies. Again, the appendix provides more
detail.
Table 1 provides the relative contributions of the intertemporal and the
cross-sectional channels at various forecast horizons.
It is a …rst interesting feature of our results that the relative contribution
of the channels does not vary over time. To save space, table 1 reports, the
10results for the one and three year horizons only but the …ndings at other
horizons are virtually identical. This is a remarkable result that we found
to be extremely robust to changes in the model speci…cation. It may seem
surprising that short-term and long-term risks are equally well insured. Intu-
itively, one might expect that various forms of capital market imperfections
would lead to a ’short-term bias’ in consumption insurance. This does not
seem to be the case.
Our results may also suggest that a fully speci…ed dynamic econometric
model as the one put forward in this paper is required to get at the issue
of dynamic risk sharing. Earlier contributions to the literature which ad-
mittedly were not primarily concerned with the dynamics of risk sharing,
tended to use a short-cut to gauge risk sharing at di¤erent horizons: they
typically look at data di¤erenced at high and low frequencies. Using this
method, Sørensen and Yosha (1998) …nd that the unsmoothed component
at the three-years horizon is much larger (roughly 75 percent) than at the
1-year horizon (roughly 60 percent). In a similar way, Canova and Ravn re-
port that lower frequency ‡uctuations in income are less insured than higher
frequency ‡uctuations. The results in our paper, including those to be re-
ported below for permanent and transitory shocks, demonstrate that these
exercises provide a good estimate of how well-insured countries are against
shocks of various degrees of persistence but not how well-insured they are
against risks at di¤erent horizons.
The last column of table 1 reports the estimate of the unconditional
model, i.e. practically a re-run of the Sørensen and Yosha (1998) procedure
on our data. These unconditional estimates display the same pattern that
was already found by Sørensen and Yosha (1998). Capital markets virtually
do not matter for risk sharing, the bulk of insurance is provided through (in-
tertemporal) self insurance. Interestingly enough, our conditional estimates
from the dynamic model …nd a somewhat more important role for interna-
tional capital markets. However, once one takes account of the estimation
uncertainty in the unconditional model, these are not too far apart.
Overall, we …nd that the conditional estimates eventually converge to
unconditional ones - at least after taking account of the relatively large es-
timation uncertainty in the unconditional model. This is reassuring as it
provides a check of speci…cation of our dynamic model as has been suggested
in section two.
The VAR based approach we have suggested in this paper, allows us
to examine an important assumption that underlies the ASY-approach: if
the GDP-GNP di¤erential and the GNP-Consumption di¤erential actually
serve as bu¤ers for shocks to output, they should be driven by exactly the
same shocks that drive GDP. In other words; the notion underlying ASY
11and the related literature is that shocks originate in output ‡uctuations and
get smoothed at various levels. But the various aggregates, i.e. the GDP-
GNP di¤erential and the GNP-C di¤erential that act as bu¤ers, should not
themselves be the source of shocks.
We can examine this assumption by conducting a principal components
analysis of the shocks to our econometric model. If the presumption under-
lying the ASY approach is correct, then there should be a single dominant
principal component in the reduced form errors that we get from the esti-
mation of the VAR. Furthermore, this principal component should be highly
correlated with innovations in the ¢gdp-equation of our model but virtually
uncorrelated with innovations in the other two equations.
I nt a b l e2 ,w eg i v et h es h a r eo ft h et o t a lv a r i a t i o ni n[¢gdp;¢gdp ¡
¢gnp;¢gnp¡¢c] that is explained by the …rst principal component of ­.A s
it turns out, we do …nd a dominant principal component in the reduced-form
errors for all groupings of countries that we examine. We then also calculated
the correlation of this principal component with unexpected innovations in
the ¢gdp-equation, i.e. "1ti as well as the ¢gdp ¡ ¢gnp-a n d¢gnp ¡ ¢c-
equations, "i2t and "i3t respectively.. These correlations are given in columns
2-4 of table 2. Our results suggest that, indeed, shocks to ¢gdp drive the
joint dynamics of [¢gdp;¢gdp¡¢gnp;¢gnp¡¢c].T h i si sav e r yi m p o r t a n t
…nding as it demonstrates the validity of our method and the static versions
of it that have been used in ASY (1996), Sørensen and Yosha (1998) and
Mélitz and Zumer.(1999).
4.1 Permanent and transitory shocks
In table 3 we provide forecast error decompositions for the di¤erent sources
of income uncertainty, i.e. permanent and transitory shocks.
These decompositions are similar to the unconditional dynamic results
we reported in table 1 in that they do not vary over time. However, our
results also reveal that there are important di¤erences in the way that the
various channels contribute to the sharing of risks that arise from di¤erent
sources of shocks.
Firstly, permanent shocks are insured to a much lesser extent than tran-
sitory shocks. This …nding is in line with earlier results in Canova and Ravn
(1996) who also found that low-frequency risks seem to be insured less than
high frequency ‡uctuations. In fact, when the panel VECM is estimated
with all countries included, transitory shocks are found to be almost per-
fectly smoothed. We note that, very much as in the unconditional case, the
forecast horizon does not matter for the extent of total insurance nor for the
relative role of the channels.
12Secondly, once we consider the channels by which these shocks get in-
sured, we …nd that insurance against transitory ‡uctuations is almost exclu-
sively achieved through the intertemporal channel. whereas, in line with the
…ndings by Sørensen and Yosha (1998), the role of capital markets remains
limited.
The results for transitory shocks tie in with recent empirical research
by Kraay, Loayza, Serven and Ventura (2000) that suggests that the inter-
national component of most countries’ portfolios is heavily biased towards
loans and bonds. On the theoretical side, Baxter and Crucini (1995) have
shown that the full risk sharing allocations that ensue as equilibria in mod-
els with complete markets can be approximated by models that feature only
n o n - s t a t ec o n t i n g e n ta s s e t s . T h i sr e s u l th o l d sa sl o n ga ss h o c k sa r en o t
too persistent. Our results highlight the empirical relevance of the Baxter
and Crucini study: even though individual countries’ international portfolios
show a huge home bias, they seem su¢ciently diversi…ed to achieve almost
full insurance against transitory output risks. This insurance seems to be
achieved largely with bonds and international credit rather than equity or
other state contingent assets.
The results we obtained for permanent shocks are particularly interesting
in two respects. First, when the model is estimated with data from all
countries, the intertemporal and the cross-sectional channels play almost
equal roles. Certainly, the bulk of permanent income risk remains uninsured,
but the relative contributions to the amount of insurance that is eventually
achieved is roughly equal for the cross-sectional and intertemporal channels.
In particular, it is noteworthy that the intertemporal channel matters at all
for the insurance against permanent risks. Models in which only the expected
path of income matters for the savings decision will not be able to rationalize
this feature of the data. Rather, income variability appears to matter in this
case. Athanasoulis and Shiller (2000) have shown how the extent of observed
precautionary saving depends on the degree of incompleteness of markets for
claims on national income. Accordingly, we interpret our …nding as evidence
of precautionary savings.
When the model is estimated with only a subgroup of countries, our result
are generally con…rmed. One particular point may be worth mentioning,
though:
The role of the cross-sectional channel, i.e. international capital markets,
for the insurance against permanent shocks is less pronounced in all of the
sub-groups than it is when the model is estimated with all 23 countries. The
sub-groups are more homogenous in terms of country-size than is the whole
panel. Our results could suggest that risk sharing through international
equity markets is more pronounced between countries of di¤erent size. In
13this respect, our results are in line with Lane (2000) who has found that
smaller countries tend to hold more foreign equity than do larger countries.
Summarizing this section, we can say that, in annual data, permanent
output ‡uctuations account for just below eighty percent of total output
variability and that only twenty percent of these ‡uctuations are insured.
Hence, we …nd that at least 60 percent of total output variability are unin-
sured. This is in line with the results obtained by Sørensen and Yosha. Our
…ndings complement theirs in that it seems that most of this uninsured com-
ponent is due to uninsured permanent shocks. This raises the question why
international capital and credit markets do so poorly in insuring people’s
consumption against permanent shocks in income.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have investigated in which way industrial countries insure
against output ‡uctuations. In so doing, we have o¤ered two important
novelties.
The …rst is that we consider how risks are insured at various horizons,
thus providing a dynamic version of the method …rst proposed by Asdrubali,
Sørensen and Yosha (1996). Our results corroborate the notion of a home
bias in international risk sharing, even for forecast horizons as low as a year.
Secondly, we also …nd evidence that an important share of the variation
in idiosyncratic output and consumption may be of a permanent nature.
Permanent shocks need to be insured through perpetual claims. The French-
Poterba observation of a home bias in international equity portfolios may
suggest that most countries are badly insured against permanent ‡uctuations
in their income streams. Once we allow for non-stationarities in our data set,
our …ndings are consistent with this view: there is generally little insurance
against permanent shocks but transitory risk in output is almost completely
insured, mainly via national and international credit markets.
The second …nding is in line with recent empirical evidence that suggests
that international portfolios do not only display a home bias but are also
severely biased towards non-state contingent assets such as bonds and loans.
A theoretical rationalization for our results may be given by Baxter and
Crucini (1995), who demonstrated that full risk-sharing allocations can be
approximated quite well in economies with imperfect capital markets as long
as shocks are not too persistent.
Our aim in this paper was to draw a map of an area of our ignorance,
i.e. how countries share risks at various time horizons. We have not put for-
ward any particular theory of how the intertemporal pattern of risk sharing
14should look like. However, any theoretical model of the home bias should
also reproduce the fact that the relative importance of risk sharing channels
does not vary over time. This may, for example, be an important restriction
on transaction-cost based explanations of the home bias as the presence of
(…xed) transactions costs may well imply that the relative roles of intertem-
poral smoothing and cross-sectional insurance vary with the forecast horizon.
Another issue that our results may raise is why permanent and transitory
shocks are insured in such di¤erent ways. Apparently, permanent shocks are
much harder to insure internationally than are transitory shocks. Why this
should be the case is not immediately clear but it is what the data tell us.
We plan to address this question in future research.
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Data Appendix
All data are from the Penn World Tables release 5.6
Variable PWT-code Line#
GDP cgdp 9
GNP rgnp 27
Cc c1 0
Population pop 1
The sample range is 1970-90.
List of Countries:
1. Canada, 2. United States, 3. Japan, 4. Austria, 5. Belgium, 6.
Denmark , 7. Finland, 8. France, 9. Germany (West), 10. Greece, 11.
Iceland, 12. Ireland, 13. Italy, 14. Luxemburg ,15. Netherlands, 16. Norway,
17. Portugal, 18. Spain, 19. Sweden, 20. Switzerland, 21. United Kingdom,
22. Australia, 23. New Zealand
G7: countries #1,2,3,8,9,13,21
EU 15: countries #4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,17,18,19,21
EU core: countries #4,5,8,9,14,15
17Technical Appendix
Anderson and Hsiao (1981) were the …rst authors to present a solution
to the problem of estimating dynamic panel data models. For the case of
a univariate AR(1), they suggested …rst di¤erencing the model to get rid of
the country-speci…c e¤ects fi a n dt h e nu s i n g(¢Xi;t¡2 ¡ ¢Xi;t¡3) or simply
¢Xi;t¡2 as an instrument for (¢Xi;t¡1¡¢Xi;t¡2). These instruments will not
be correlated with (ui;t ¡ ui;t¡1). This instrumental variables (IV) estima-
tion method leads to consistent but not necessarily e¢cient estimates of the
parameters of the model. In the sequel, several other studies (e.g. Arellano
and Bond, 1991) suggested instruments leading to more e¢cient estimates.
The above-mentioned problems are not speci…c to VARs.
In a landmark paper, Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988) - HNR for
short - explained how to estimate VARs in a panel framework and proposed
an IV type estimation procedure which we will now brie‡y explain.5
T h es p e c i … c a t i o no f( 8 )a sap r o j e c t i o ni m p l i e st h a tt h ee r r o rt e r muit
satis…es the orthogonality condition
E[¢X
0
isuit]= E[f
0
iuit] s<t (13)
We can exploit these orthogonality conditions to identify the parameters
of the model. Taking …rst di¤erences on (8), we obtain
¢Xit ¡ ¢Xit¡1=¤ t +
p X
l=1
©l(¢Xi;t¡l ¡ ¢Xi;t¡l¡1)+vit i =1 ;:::;K;t = p +2 ;:::;T
(14)
where
¤t = ¸t ¡ ¸t¡1 (15)
vit = uit ¡ ui;t¡1
We will now discuss identi…cation of the parameters of the transformed
equation (14) and then see how the original parameters can be recovered.
The orthogonality conditions of equation (13) imply that the error term
of the transformed equation (14) satis…es the orthogonality condition
E[¢X
0
isvit]= E[f
0
ivit] s<t¡ 1 (16)
5Holtz-Eakin et al. deal with the more general case of an interacted country-speci…c
and time e¤ect ¸tfi and with time-varying coe¢cients.
18Therefore, Zit =[ e;(¢Xi;t¡2¡¢Xi;t¡3);(¢Xi;t¡3¡¢Xi;t¡4);:::;(¢Xi2¡
¢Xi1)] qualify as instrumental variables. The original parameters are iden-
ti…ed if T ¸ p +3 .6 Note that the number of instruments increases with t.
Thus, the HNR estimator is more e¢cient than an IV estimator based on
once-lagged endogenous variables alone (as in Anderson and Hsiao, 1981).
Estimation yields the coe¢cients [©1;:::;©p], and we can calculate the
variance-covariance matrix ­¤ of the transformed system. Using (15), we
are able to recover the variance-covariance matrix of the original system.
The estimated coe¢cients [©1;:::;©p] c a nb eu s e dt oo b t a i nt h ec o e ¢ c i e n t
matrices Cl of the moving average representation. Finally, we can compute
the mean squared prediction error using (6) from which the results in the
main text follow immediately.
6Alternatively, following Arellano (1989) we used ”level” values Zit =
[e;¢Xi;t¡2;¢Xi;t¡3;:::;¢Xi1] as instruments in which case we also gain one more
period for estimation because in this case identi…cation only requires T ¸ p +2 .T h e
results, however are very similar which we consider a robustness check of our empirical
strategy.
19Table 1: Risk Sharing at various horizons
Country group Forecast Horizon in years Unconditional
13 M o d e l
a) All ¯C 0:09 (0:004) 0:09 (0:004) 0:001 (0:03)
¯S 0:29 (0:002) 0:29 (0:002) 0:32 (0:14)
b) G7 ¯C ¡0:03 (0:01) ¡0:03 (0:01) 0:01 (0:03)
¯S 0:51 (0:04) 0:51 (0:04) 0:33 (0:13)
c) EU15 ¯C 0:004 (0:01) 0:004 (0:01) ¡0:02 (0:04)
¯S 0:19 (0:05) 0:19 (0:05) 0:21 (0:18)
d) EU core ¯C ¡0:02 (0:02) ¡0:02 (0:02) ¡0:02 (0:04)
¯S 0:33 (0:09) 0:33 (0:09) 0:34 (0:18)
Values in parentheses are standard deviations.
For the unconditional model these are asymptotic whereas for the dynamic
model they have been obtained using 100 bootstrap replications.
Table 2: Share of …rst principal component
and correlation with GDP shocks
Variance Correlation of 1. PC with
explained by 1. PC "i1t "i2t "i3t
All 91% 0.99 -0.09 0.00
G7 94% 0.99 -0.13 0.00
Euro 15 77% 0.99 -0.13 0.00
EU core 78% 0.97 -0.23 0.00
20Table 3: Smoothing of permanent and transitory shocks
Country group Type of shock Variance share
permanent transitory of permanent shocks
a) All ¯C 0:10 (0:005) 0:03 (0:01)
¯S 0:11 (0:03) 0:91 (0:40) 0:77 (0:03)
b) G7 ¯C ¡0:05 (0:02) ¡0:03 (0:03)
¯S 0:36 (0:06) 0:96 (0:32) 0:72 (0:05)
c) EU15 ¯C ¡0:007 (0:02) 0:03 (0:03)
¯S 0:54 (0:07) ¡0:62 (0:38)) 0:70 (0:04)
d) EU core ¯C ¡0:15 (0:05) 0:11 (0:05)
¯S 0:04 (0:19) 0:62 (0:26) 0:49 (0:09)
Standard errors (in parentheses) were obtained from
100 bootstrap replications of the model
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